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ABSTRACT 
 
Adam A. Johnson 
 
Re-examining the Role of Southern Democrats:  
An Analysis of the Southern Advantage in Congress between 1947 and 1992 
and its Effect on Conditional Party Government 
(Under the direction of Erik Engstrom) 
 
 The traditional story of the Congressional literature tells us that 
institutional forces shaped the shift in power between Northern and 
Southern Democrats in the 1970s. Specifically, past work suggests that 
Democratic Party reforms weakened the Southern Democrats by depriving 
them of leadership positions. This paper argues that electoral replacement 
was much more likely the engine of change. Northern Democrats did take 
control of the Congressional Committees in the 1970s, but that transition was 
a quarter decade long transition in the making rather than a skilled political 
maneuver. A secondary analysis contributes to our understanding of the 
Democratic Caucus in the House by examining how Southern Democrats 
came to establish their base of power prior to the 1960s. Using an Event 
History Analysis, the conclusion here is that Southern Democrats enjoyed a 
substantially more favorable electoral environment which contributed to 
their enhanced seniority over time.  
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Re-examining the Role of Southern Democrats: An Analysis of the Southern 
Advantage in Congress between 1947 and 1992 and its Effect on Conditional 
Party Government 
 
 
 Over the course of the past forty years, Congressional scholars have 
advanced our understanding of Congress and the forces that guide its 
members. Within that context, detailed analysis has extended our 
understanding of partisanship within the institution, how members are 
elected, and how the structure of Congress guides its members. Despite those 
critical advances, the discipline still relies on a number of untested, yet 
critical, assumptions. First, David Rohde (1991) suggests that we all know 
that Southern Democrats achieved an unprecedented overrepresentation in 
membership on so-called prestige committees and in committee chairs in the 
period leading up to the critical reform era (the early 1970s). Upon closer 
inspection, Rohde’s work appears to contain no detailed analysis of the extent 
to which Southern Democrats achieved a substantial bias in their favor. More 
importantly, we are left without a clear picture of what a substantial bias 
would even look like. Since the presence of a bias is a critical component in 
Rohde’s study, it seems imperative that additional analysis be conducted. 
Second, a related set of assumptions involves our understanding of the 
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manner in which Southern Democrats came to dominate the prestigious 
committees. Again, the extant work simply takes the dominance in this 
period as a well understood given: “It is well known that in the twentieth 
century Southern representatives tended to serve longer in Congress than 
members from other regions” (Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999, 500). We may 
know that Southern Democrats served longer, but the literature appears 
agnostic regarding the question of how that institutional bias in membership 
developed.  
This project is an effort to critically examine these two omissions from 
the literature. The first section will examine two separate yet related topics. 
Initially, we will examine the extent to which Southern Democrats controlled 
the committee process on the eve of reform. Rohde (1991) informs us that we 
should expect critical changes in Congress following the Democratic Party’s 
internal rule changes between 1972 and 1975. While other reforms took place 
over the course of a 20 year period, that three year timeframe is the critical 
time period and thus the focus of our attention. We will ultimately discover 
that on the eve of reform, the imbalance in these committees was already 
being resolved. Then, the focus turns to examining the extent to which the 
committees, committee chairs, and general Democratic Caucus changed in 
the manner that Rohde suggests. Again, we will conclude that Congress did 
not change as expected.  
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Having established that the reform era did not proceed as expected, it 
is important in the second section to examine how Southern Democrats even 
arrived at the point of having the excess power that they held in the 1960s. 
Using an event history analysis, the overwhelming conclusion is that 
electoral forces united in the 1920s-1960s to produce a Democratic Caucus 
with seniority concentrated in the hands of the Southern members of the 
Caucus. Controlling for other factors, the conclusion is that, in that time 
period, being Southern decreased the risk of primary losses and general 
election losses, while Non-Southerners were more likely to seek appointment 
to other federal and state offices. These findings more firmly establish exactly 
how the Southerners came to enjoy the power they did establish prior to the 
reform era.  
 
 
I. Reexamining the Congress of the 1960s and 1970s 
 
 
A. Examining Representation in Congressional Committees  
 
 
Rohde’s 1991 book painted an entirely new picture of the 
Congressional landscape. In introducing us to the concept of Conditional 
Party Government, he argues that party government exists only when there 
is homogeneity within the party caucuses and a clear distinction between the 
two parties. To advance that argument, he examines the critical institutional 
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reform period of the United States Congress that spans the 93rd and 94th 
Congresses (1973-1976). He suggests that Northern Democrats pushed 
through a series of intra-chamber rule changes that permitted them to take 
control of their party. Their opposition, the Conservative Coalition, had 
allegedly biased control of Congress by having Southern Democrats hold the 
key positions of power within the Congress. Consistent with this argument, 
we would expect to see Southern Democrats in a few key positions. In 
particular, we would expect them to hold a sizeable number of committee 
chairs (especially on the prestige committees)1 and have sizable numbers of 
members on the prestige committees. If Southern Democrats did not hold 
these positions on the eve of the reform era, then a critical piece of Rohde’s 
explanation falls.  
To consider these expectations, we can examine those who held 
committee chairs and those who were on the critical prestige committees 
during this period. Charles Stewart and Garrison Nelson have conducted 
previous analysis on this subject and have kindly made their data available 
on the web (Nelson 2007). Their dataset permits us to examine every member 
of Congress between 1947 and 1992 and their committee membership with 
leadership status in each term. Using this data, it is possible to examine the 
power of Southern Democrats through time. 
                                                 
1 The Prestige Committees are defined as the Rules, Appropriations, Ways & Means, and Budget 
Committees. Special Focus is placed on the Rules Committee, because much of the legislative agenda 
could be stalled in that committee.  
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Figure 1A2 provides the percentage of Democratic chairs in the US 
House broken down by region from 1947 through 1992.3 The most notable 
trend in this figure is that the low point of Non Southern Committee Chairs 
happens in the 89th Congress in 1965. By the start of the reform era in the 
93rd Congress, Southern Democrats had already taken quite a hit in their 
share of Committee Chairs. In addition, the only downward movement in the 
series between 1965 and the peak in 1979 is the small downward tick in the 
94th Congress, the real focal period after the bulk of the reforms. While we see 
a notable decrease in the power of Southern Democrats after 1965 (with Non 
Southern Democrats passing the Southern Democrats in the number of 
chairs by 1969), it is important to place our analysis within the relevant 
context of the time. If the number of Non Southern Democrats in Congress 
was increasing, then we would expect to see more representation for that 
group. Figure 1B does provide us with evidence of Southern Democrats losing 
seats in Congress. By 1957, Non Southern Democrats achieved a majority of 
the Democratic Party, but they certainly did not hold a majority of chairs at 
that time. 
                                                 
2 All Tables and Figures are available in the Appendix that is included with the paper. 
 
3 It should be noted that the Democratic Party did not control Congress for all of these terms. In the 80th and 
83rd Congresses, the Republican Party actually controlled Congress. So in these cases, the percentage of 
Chairs is actually the percentage of ranking members. Because the inclusion of these two terms does not 
alter our impressions, they remain to avoid the confusion associated with unnecessarily missing data points. 
In addition, I use the standard ICPSR coding for Regions. The South is defined as the focal point of the Old 
Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia. The Border South is defined as the states that directly border the Deep South: 
Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, D.C., West Virginia. The rest of the nation is 
grouped as the Non-South. 
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Based on this initial look at the data, we need another way to 
conceptualize bias. Rather than relying on raw numbers, I created a measure 
of the extent to which each group is getting what they “should” receive or 
what they “deserve.” This is not a perfect measure, because we would expect 
there to be some sort of delay between the time that a region gains seats and 
when it realizes its success at the level of receiving Committee Chairs. Using 
the proportion of the total number of Democratic members in Congress from 
the various regions (Non South, South, and Border) as our baseline 
expectation for chairs and committee membership, it is possible to calculate a 
deviation from that expectation for each Congress that serves as a reasonable 
proxy of the bias in the Committee system. Figure 2A depicts this deviation 
in the expected number of committee chairs for each region. Plainly obvious 
from this figure is that Non Southerners experienced a huge deficit in their 
hold on the share of chairs during the 1960s. In the 89th Congress, Non 
Southerners received over 30% fewer chairs than we would expect based upon 
their share of seats in Congress. Figure 2B shows the same trend but 
expresses the trend in terms of seat loss rather than percentage loss. At the 
worst point, Non Southerners lacked almost 8 chairs that they “deserved.”  
All of these findings are consistent with our general tendency to 
assume overrepresentation by Southern Democrats, but the findings are not 
wholly consistent with Rohde’s analysis. When the reform movement was 
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hitting its stride, Non Southern Democrats suffered a mere 10% deficit from 
the expected number of chairs. That deficit translates into 2 lost Chairs – one 
to the Border South and one to the Deep South. For there to be an uprising to 
resolve a crisis in representation, one would expect to see a much larger 
deficit – more like the one experienced in 1965 than the one experienced in 
1973. In addition, by 1981 the deficit in chairs had returned to the same 
position from 1973 – a loss of 2 seats again. Had the reform period really 
caused the changes that Rohde suggests, one would have expected to see 
these deficits permanently resolved. Of particular interest, the bias actually 
gets worse in 1975 when Northern Democrats had theoretically hit their 
stride in reclaiming Congress from the Conservative Coalition. Figures 2C 
and 2D depict the same trend, but do so with a grouping of the Border States 
and the Deep South. The implications do not change when these figures are 
consulted. 
A secondary piece of Rohde’s argument is that Northern Democrats 
were able to take control of appointing members to the big prestige 
committees after the reform period:  
Committee independence and influence was also counterbalanced by the measures 
that strengthened the Democratic party leaders, the second reform track. The 
transfer of Democratic committee-assignment powers to the Steering and Policy 
Committee, coupled with direct Speaker control over Rules Committee appointments, 
expanded leadership influence over members’ access to the most desirable spots in 
the committee system (Rohde 1991, 165). 
 
As a result, it seems relevant to examine these same deviations for the 
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membership of Appropriations, Rules, Ways & Means, and Budget. 
Beginning with the Appropriations committee, Figure 3A shows the 
percentage deviation in membership across the same time period. In this 
case, it is the Border States that really controlled the Appropriations 
committee. By 1973, the Non Southern share deviated by less than 2%. 
Consulting Figure 3B, that deviation represents a 0.5 seat loss on 
Appropriations. In fact, the Deep South actually suffered a larger deficit on 
Appropriations than the Non-South. Consistent with the analysis on 
Committee Chairs, by 1979 Non Southerners returned to their previous 
status with a deficit in representation. Grouping the South and Border South 
in 3C, the appearance is different, but the implication is the same – in 1977 
the Non Southerners achieved parity on Appropriations, but most years show 
the same two seat deficit across the board.  
The Rules Committee is described by Rohde (1991) as one of the 
critical places Northern Democrats sought to establish control. Figure 4A 
shows that in this case, even more so than any other, Non Southern 
Democrats achieved parity in 1967, a few Congresses before the start of the 
reforms. A pro-Southern bias does not establish itself again until the end of 
the reform period. Figures 4B and 4C depict the same trend and show the 
insignificant Southern bias through much of the reform period. Ways & 
Means provides an even more confusing pattern. Figure 5A shows that the 
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1950s represent the greatest Southern deficit. Figure 5C provides the best 
evidence of a Southern advantage, but even here, the advantage expands and 
dissipates throughout the reform period and into the following years. Finally, 
the Budget Committee is the last of the prestige committees. Established in 
the 93rd Congress, Figure 6A depicts Budget’s inconsistent trend that is 
similar to that of the Ways & Means Committee.  Southern advantage dips in 
1973 and 1979, but it rebounds in the other years. Figure 6B and 6C yield the 
same conclusions.  
A final look involves aggregating all of the prestige committees to see if 
we can find any trends with a broader base of information. Figure 7 presents 
the analysis excluding Budget while Figure 8 includes Budget. Because the 
Budget Committee does not exist for all of these years, it is important to 
consider it as a potentially separate case. Figure 7A shows that the largest 
bias exists for the Border States, but 7B shows that at worst that bias is only 
a four seat bias across the three committees. The Non Southern states do 
improve their standing in these committees in 1973 and reach parity, but two 
interesting trends are notable. First, the Non Southern states found 
themselves with a 3 seat deficit in 1975, just 1 congress removed from 
achieving parity. Second, the Non Southern states stalled at about a 1%-2% 
deficit (~1 seat) until 1989. Adding the Budget committee in Figure 8 does 
not change our conclusions. 8C depicts a trend in which the combined Border 
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and Deep South achieved small advantages in some years, but for the most 
part the South and the Non South bounced back and forth between having 
small advantages and losing control. 
Through this analysis, we learn quite a lot. First, history did not play 
out exactly as Rohde suggests. On the eve of reform, Southerners did not 
have disproportionate power, and the reform period appears to do little to 
change the Southern hold on committees. Throughout this period, Southern 
Democrats were decreasing in their numbers (largely replaced by 
Republicans), but they continued to hold more seats and Chairs than they 
should. If anything, the implication appears to be that replacement might 
have had a powerful effect, but the rules changes appear to do little. A second 
implication of this analysis is that we do find that Southerners had a 
substantial overrepresentation, but that tremendous bias really just occurred 
earlier than suggested. In the 1950s and 1960s, Southern Democrats did have 
a substantial power base in Congress. Section II will be devoted to 
understanding how that power base was established. 
 
 
B. Considering the Implications for Conditional Party 
Government 
 
 
Before moving on to Section II, we do now have a new twist that needs 
to be resolved in Rohde’s analysis. While not the core focus of this paper, this 
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argument does invoke a key debate among those who study the structure of 
the parties in Congress. A critical part of the Conditional Party Government 
argument is that these party based rule changes culminated in the 
Democratic Party’s movement in a liberal direction after 1972 (Collie and 
Brady 1985, Rohde 1991, Aldrich and Rohde 1998). Other scholars have 
echoed most of the findings, but have also suggested that some trends have 
existed across time that have consistently empowered majorities regardless of 
the homogeneity of the party base in Congress. It has been argued that 
traditional arrangements like the power of the party to pick leadership, 
controlling staff, floor agenda control, rules committee control, and select 
committee membership control have persisted even without homogeneity 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). For advocates of Conditional Party 
Government to be correct, they need for replacement to provide homogeneity, 
for individual members during this period to move in a liberal direction, and 
for the party to have been successful in creating the organizational structure 
it preferred. Based upon the analysis above, we already have evidence that 
the Democratic Party failed to place the members it desired: it is fairly clear 
that well after the reform period the Southern Democrats continued to have 
an overrepresentation of chairs and seats in prestige committees. Resolving 
the replacement question and the ideological shift question is still necessary.  
 The first additional step is to resolve the question of whether or not 
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replacement achieved the expected outcome. Resolving this is simple; we 
would expect that new Democrats were largely liberal. Fortunately, we can 
examine the average ideology score for new Democrats in each region across 
time. The expectation is that most of these newer Democrats will be coming 
from Northern states and thus that the party will move in a liberal direction. 
Majority minority and urban districts should spawn most of the new 
Southern Democrats after 1970 and thus we would expect them to move in a 
liberal direction as well. There are two ways to examine this question – from 
the perspective of the entire Democratic Caucus and from the perspective of 
the Democratic chairs.  
Figure 9 provides the mean DW-Nominate score for the Democratic 
Caucus in each Congress by Region. Consistent with Rhode’s (1991) analysis, 
Southern Democrats did move noticeably in a liberal direction in the 93rd 
Congress – 1973. Table 1 provides a simple statistical test of this movement. 
This test compares the 5 Congresses before the ideological movement to the 5 
Congresses after the movement. While not a sharp movement in the liberal 
direction, the change in 1973 is a statistically significant move of 0.0854 
increments (p<0.0001). The change in the other regions is not particularly 
large and not significant.  
Figure 10 provides the same picture, but this time we capture only the 
DW-Nominate scores of the Democratic Chairs by region. Consistent with 
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Figure 9, there is a notable move in the liberal direction by Southern Chairs 
in the 93rd Congress. Table 2 provides the same test as the previous section 
comparing the 5 years before and after the Reform era changes. Again, the 
liberal move by Southern Democrats is small – only 0.0694 increments – but 
the move is significant (p=0.03). The movement in the Chairs from the other 
regions is quite small and does not reach conventional levels of significance. 
Because the sample sizes are so small, I do report the difference for all 
regions combined and find that the 0.1 increment movement is significant 
(p<0.0001). These findings provide support for Rhode’s position that the 
Southern Democrats were in fact changed in their voting behavior by the 
Rules changes in 1973. In fact, these last two figures serve to replicate 
Rhode’s own analysis.  
 The second step is to examine the extent to which continuing members 
changed their views. We now know that aggregate changes occurred in the 
Southern Democratic group between the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. What we 
do not know is whether or not minds were actually changed by the Rules 
changes. Recent scholarship provides inconsistent findings on this subject. 
One school of thought suggests that members do not change their voting 
patterns through time (Poole 2003). Once members arrive in Washington, we 
expect them to adhere to a consistent ideology throughout their terms in the 
Congress. A second viewpoint suggests that it is possible for members to 
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change their votes across time. Jacobson contradicts Poole and argues that 
members do change their voting patterns through time with Democrats being 
more likely to have moved to the left and Republicans being more likely to 
have moved to the right (Jacobson 2008, 17). For our purposes here, 
Jacobson’s analysis does not resolve the debate. First, Jacobson only looks at 
the period after 1980. We really need to know what was going on during the 
critical reform period. Rohde presents one case study of Jaime Whitten, who 
is seen to change his votes during this period, but we receive no other 
systematic evidence (Rohde 1991, 46). Second, with additional controls, 
Jacobson’s finding for Southern Democrats is not significant for the period 
after 1980 (Jacobson 2008, 17). My expectation is that many members 
probably do change their attitudes to some extent, but it would be unusual 
for Southern Democrats to change their views during this critical period. 
Southern Democrats might have faced some challenges from Northern 
Liberals, but many of these Southerners were established and likely had 
ideological commitments to their positions. Resolving this debate requires 
looking at the ideology scores for continuing members. Consistent with Poole 
(2003), the hypothesis here is that Southern Democrats did not change their 
voting patterns.  
 In order to test this hypothesis, I carved out members who served in 
both the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. By doing this, we can examine the extent 
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to which members changed their voting behavior in response to the Rules 
changes. If ideology did not change among this group, then we know that 
replacement is the primary mechanism for Democratic Party changes in the 
1970s. Table 3 provides the statistical test of the mean difference for 
continuing members of the Democratic Caucus. During this period, 
continuing Southern Democrats moved 0.0147 increments (1/20th of a 
standard deviation) in a liberal direction and the change is not significant 
(p=0.34). The findings for the other regions are the same. Conducting the 
same analysis for the continuing Chairs yields similar results. Table 4 
provides the statistical tests for each of the regions. Consistent with the 
continuing members of the broader caucus, the continuing Chairs changed 
very little. Of note, the Southern Chairs move all of 0.0002 increments on 
average (p=0.5007). The other regions show similarly small movements. 
These tests for continuing members suggest that the Rules changes did very 
little to alter the behavior of members of Congress – be they general members 
of the Caucus or the Chairs themselves. New member certainly did join the 
Caucus and new individuals rose to being Chairs. Those new individuals 
certainly did change the ideological flavor of the Democratic Party, but Rules 
changes had very little to do with their arrival in Washington. 
 The final test of this theory is to examine the leadership of the prestige 
committees. According to Rhode, the Chairs of these Committees were of 
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particular importance to the Northern Democrats. If these Committees were 
held by Southerners who were replaced by Northern Democrats, then the 
power of the Rules changes would be more credible. Table 5 provides the 
names of the Chairs, their region, and their DW-Nominate scores for each 
term of Congress. In the case of each committee, an established Chair left in 
the 1970s opening the door for the Party leadership to insert a party loyalist. 
In each case, a moderate (though not conservative) Democrat, who was 
simply atop the seniority ladder, came to power. On the Ways and Means 
Committee, Wilbur Mills (D-AR) served for 9 Congresses and maintained a 
relatively conservative Nominate score. Mills departed unceremoniously from 
his position as Chair in 1974, leading one to wonder whether or not he was 
forced out by the Party leadership. In reality, Mills’ bouts of public 
intoxication and his links to Argentine stripper Fanne Foxe ultimately lead to 
his demise (Zelizer 2000). Albert Ullman (D-OR) had served since 1957 and 
sat atop the seniority list on the Committee and thus rose to power in the 94th 
Congress. The Appropriations Committee featured 8 term chair George 
Mahon (D-TX). Despite a very conservative Nominate score, he survived the 
Rules Change era until his retirement in 1978, when he was replaced by 
seniority leader Jaime Whitten (D-MS), who had been elected initially in 
1941. Finally, the Rules Committee featured more turnover than the other 
prestige committees during this period. William Colmer (D-MS) was an 
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established segregationist who campaigned three times for Richard Nixon 
(Kuzenski, Moreland and Steed 2001). He conspicuously departed after the 
92nd Congress. Additional research suggests, however, that he had just 
completed his 40th year in Congress in 1972! He retired and endorsed his 
young aide, Trent Lott, who would run under the GOP banner in 1972. 
Replacing Colmer as Chair was Ray Madden (D-IN) who was originally 
elected in 1943 and held a substantial seniority lead. In each of these cases, 
the Committee did move to the left with new leadership, but the change was 
much more a function of replacement than ideological shift of the Chair or a 
deviation from seniority order. Figure 11 plots the DW-Nominate scores of 
the Chairs of these Committees and depicts clearly the overall broader 
ideological move to the Left.  
 It is certainly possible that Rohde and others who have argued in favor 
of the rules changes affecting Congressional output would respond to this 
analysis by suggesting that the Speaker’s enhanced power could still affect 
outcomes in the Congress. To some extent, this criticism is a fair one. The 
reform era certainly did enhance the position of the Speaker and the Steering 
and Policy Committee. If their power had a direct effect, we would still expect 
that the voting patterns of continuing members would change. The preceding 
section provides evidence that any ideology changes that occurred in 
Congress came about because of replacement rather than institutional forces. 
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In this view, any increased power in the Speaker came about simply because 
like-minded ideologues came to Congress who were willing to support a more 
liberal Speaker. As such, the argument here is that we have limited direct 
evidence of leadership changes by the Democratic Party systematically 
affecting the work of Congress.  
 In future analysis, a critical control is needed to ensure that our 
analysis is accurate. By the 1965 to 1977 period, a rural/urban split was 
likely growing in the South. We have empirical evidence suggesting that the 
growth of Suburbs was a critical part of the Republican strategy in the South 
(Shafer and Johnson 2006). As such, it would not be surprising if Urban 
Southern Democrats did change their vote patterns while their suburban and 
rural counterparts fought against Republican takeover by maintaining their 
conservatism. If this hypothesis is correct, then we would have even more 
persuasive evidence that the rules changes of 1970s did not produce the 
anticipated results. That finding would certainly undermine the theoretical 
basis for the Conditional Party Government argument and provide us with a 
much more detailed understanding of the reform era. Having examined the 
reform era and found some expected trends, the next section begins the 
process of exploring how a Southern Democratic bias ever developed. 
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II. A Closer Look at How the South Achieved the 
Unprecedented Power that it Did Achieve before 1965 
 
 
A. Examining Existing Work on Historical Southern 
Electoral Patterns 
 
 
It is no secret in the Political Science literature that the South has 
established an unusual political tradition. Classic works have demonstrated 
that the period of Reconstruction brought a few Republicans to power in the 
South, but when the Federal Government left a prolonged period of 
Democratic control was spawned (Key 1996). Schattschneider (1960) 
describes the “System of 1896” as having regionalized politics with Southern 
areas becoming monolithically Democratic and Midwestern and Northeastern 
areas becoming monolithically Republican. While these works provide us a 
clear picture of the electoral world, we ironically receive only a limited 
picture of how the Southern politicians achieved so much seniority relative to 
their Northern, Midwestern, and Western colleagues. This section is an effort 
to resolve that debate and gain a better understanding of the process that 
resulted in Southern Democrats controlling committee assignments and 
committee chairs. 
A number of scholars have made valuable contributions to our 
understanding of this critical period in American history, but they ultimately 
fail to tell the entire story. Of note, Witmer (1964) examines the number of 
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members serving additional terms beyond their freshman term in the House 
and finds that through time there is a remarkable increase in the return rate 
to Congress. He attributes some of this trend to life expectancy increases and 
additional staff, but also makes a regional observation. Consistent with other 
research, he observes that the Southern return rate is higher, but gives us no 
reasons for this trend. More recent work has examined the related topic of 
increasing “careerism” in the House. Examining the period from 1870 to 
1930, Brady, Buckley and Rivers (1999) do note that reelection rates were 
higher in the South during this period, but their analysis ends before the 
Depression and thus compromises what we can learn. They do provide us 
with one critical piece of guidance in suggesting the importance of primaries: 
“It was during this period that Democrats achieved dominance in the South. 
In a one-party system, competition occurs in primary, not general, elections. 
Once Southern incumbents were renominated, they were almost certain to 
win the general election” (Brady, Buckley and Rivers 1999, 503). Rising from 
this work, it will ultimately be important to examine the differences in 
primary elections in the North and the South following the Depression.  
While we still have cause to examine the path for Southerners to 
achieve their unprecedented seniority, the Southern politics literature does 
provide us with a number of critical details about the electoral system during 
this period. Examining partisanship across the South, recent work has 
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examined just how much the Democratic Party controlled the South. In 1952, 
Southern party identification was 75% Democratic, and it continued along 
that path until the 1970s. In the context of statewide Southern office, the 
picture is even more stark. Until 1994, when there was a dramatic surge in 
statewide Republican elections, the number of statewide GOP officeholders 
across the South was less than 20% (Hayes and McKee 2008). These findings 
certainly show that a lack of competition at the General Election level in the 
South is one cause of enhanced Seniority among Southern Democrats.  
Additional work paints an excellent portrait of Southern partisanship 
and realignment, but the bulk of it examines contemporary politics and thus 
does not carefully examine the rise to power for Southern Democrats before 
1970. We have learned that Black support for the Democrats has decreased 
Democratic support in the South (Petrocik and Desposato 1998) and that 
generational change has accelerated the process by providing a fertile soil for 
GOP mobilization (Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002). Other works 
suggest that the Civil Rights era fundamentally moved the GOP into control 
(Carmines and Stimson 1989), while Reagan’s efforts completed the 
realignment of the South (Black and Black 2002). All of these empirical 
works contribute to our understanding of Southern politics, but none 
concretely explains how the Southern Democrats ever reached their zenith of 
power in the 1960s. 
 
   
 22
 
B. Explaining the Period of Party Convergence with the 
Southern Democratic Rise to Power 
 
 
Much of the desire for explaining this period comes from the need to 
explain other unusual trends in the politics of the 1960s. At the same time 
that the graphs in section 1 show a trough in the expected number of Non 
Southern Democratic chairs and committee members, other scholars have 
shown that partisanship experienced a strange crash. Shickler (2002) shows 
that the Republican and Democratic floor medians converged between 1950 
and 1980 only to expand back to their previous distance thereafter. He also 
shows that the standard deviation of the party’s ideology scores shot upward 
during the same period while being low prior to and after this period. The 
exact same period also features a uniquely high sophomore surge and a 
uniquely low retirement slump (Alford and Brady 1991). Figure 12 depicts 
this uncharacteristic spike beginning in 1960. If that were not a sufficient 
number of unusual commingling trends, Figure 13 shows this same time 
period as a uniquely pro-incumbent period as well. Finally, Polsby (1968) 
demonstrates that the run up to the 1960s represented a unique time period 
for the enhanced professionalization of the United States Congress, with 
more representatives staying longer and more resources available to them.  
Consistent with all of these trends is a notable increase in the power of 
Southern Democrats. While this is hardly a new observation, the explanation 
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of how Southern Democrats came to occupy their positions of power might 
well be the cause of these other trends as well. Figure 14 overlays two 
different trends. On the left is the party unity score for Southern Democrats. 
The data for those unity scores is taken directly from Rohde (1991, 15). The 
variable on the right is the Non Southern seat bias on the prestige 
committees from Section I. The trends certainly match well and the 
correlation coefficient is .67. A time series regression of Southern Democratic 
unity scores on the committee bias produces a significant relationship at the 
.007 level where B1 = 4.22 with an R2 of 0.44. Given these results, it is 
reasonable to conclude that we are measuring similar trends. As such, it 
seems critical that we examine the path to this bias.  
A number of scholars have examined this period with an eye toward 
explaining the incumbency advantage of this era. The consistent message of 
this literature is that incumbents are rewarded during the election season 
because of the benefits they have delivered during their time in office (Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974; Cover 1977; Erikson 
1971; King and Gelman 1991; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). The most common 
reason for this incumbency advantage is an overwhelming resource 
advantage among incumbents. Because incumbents are well known and have 
an institutional track record, they are able to raise substantial sums of 
money that assists with their reelection efforts (Abramowitz 1991; Cox and 
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Katz 1996; Kazee 1983; Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Fiorina 1977). While this 
literature goes a long way towards explaining contemporary trends in 
reelection rates, it assists very little in this project. Because we want to know 
how a tremendous imbalance occurred initially, merely understanding that 
incumbents have an advantage is of little value. In both regions (North and 
South), incumbents should have had advantages. In addition, the bulk of this 
work asserts that these incumbency and resource advantage effects are 
relatively recent phenomena.  
Abromowitz, Alexander, and Gunter (2006) add their own spin on this 
problem and demonstrate that competition in the House has declined for two 
reasons. First, much like those authors above, they find that financial 
advantages have contributed to incumbency advantages. Second, consistent 
with Oppenheimer (2005) and Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003), they 
find that a shift in the partisan composition of House districts has left 
districts less competitive in the aggregate. This second explanation is an 
interesting explanation for recent electoral changes, but again it is a recent 
phenomenon. We have no reason to believe that in the 1940s congressional 
districts fundamentally shifted in their partisanship. As such, this 
explanation for modern trends, while intriguing, is of little value. 
Despite an ongoing research tradition to explain why marginal races 
have disappeared, some authors have adopted a completely different 
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perspective. In the most extreme case, we are told that this entire research 
project has been misguided and has incorrectly concluded that the marginal 
races ever disappeared: “Clearly, if House incumbents are no more likely to 
win reelection, if the marginals have not really vanished, if seat swings are 
hardly less sensitive to vote swings, electoral competition has not, in any 
meaningful sense, declined” (Jacobson 1987, 132). This analysis offers a 
unique spin that simply comes along too late to be of any value in our 
explanation. We now know, based on Section I, that a gross imbalance had 
occurred prior to the period in which the marginal seats allegedly 
disappeared. As such, Jacobson’s explanation provides great insight into the 
1970s and beyond, but again does not contribute to our understanding of the 
period that’s leads up to the reform era. 
Fortunately, a couple of projects do have insights that apply directly to 
our understanding. In one of his classic “soaking and poking” works, Fenno 
(2000) directs us to the manner in which a particular Southern House 
member, Jack Flynt (D-GA), faced each of his elections. Specific reference is 
made to the fact that the only election that ever mattered in the South was 
the Democratic Primary. Based on previous work, this alone is not surprising. 
What is interesting is that Flynt only experienced one primary challenge 
between his initial election in 1954 and his retirement in 1978. The reason 
for his retirement was a changing district and the belief that he would never 
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become Chair of Appropriations. (Fenno 2000, 86). The initial expectations 
for a seat like this would be intense biennial primaries and token opposition 
(if any) in the general election. Fierce primaries like the 2006 Connecticut 
Democratic Primary between Lieberman and Lamont should have been the 
norm. This example from Fenno suggests that, in fact, Southern Primaries 
were hardly competitive either. Other empirical work has established that 
these primaries allowed for the creation of a “personal vote” that propelled 
candidates forward in subsequent elections (Katz and Sala 1994). 
Fortunately, this primaries hypothesis is a testable proposition. The obvious 
direction is to estimate the probability of facing a primary challenge in the 
North and the South in the years between 1930 and 1965. If Southerners 
were uniquely immune from primary challenges and thus any competition at 
all, we would expect to see more Southern Democrats in leadership roles. 
Ultimately, this section aims to resolve a period that is an apparent 
aberration in the scholarly work. The first step is to examine primary election 
rates by region. The existing literature provides a mixed picture, but in 
general suggests that we should see limited electoral competition of any 
variety in the South. In addition, retirement rates also need to be considered. 
It is always possible that Southerners embraced the idea of being “careerists” 
earlier than did representatives in the North. When seniority is the path to 
being a committee chair and sitting on prestige committees, then regions 
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with members that have a tendency to stay in Congress longer will inevitably 
be rewarded with leadership positions. Because Roosevelt should have 
brought with him a sizeable number of Northern Democrats in the 1930s, 
there should have been ample senior Democrats from the North by the 1960s 
to serve as Chairs. Since there apparently were not, general tendencies to 
seek reelection almost have to be a key part of the explanation. 
Apart from primary losses and retirements, the most obvious way to 
leave Congress is through a disappointing performance in a general election. 
The expectation is that Southerners should face almost no general election 
challenges and thus that the Non-South should face a much higher risk of 
general election losses. The final paths to departure are less common, but 
still important. It is possible that there could be a higher death rate among 
one region in Congress than others. Since only a few extremely senior 
members are needed to control the committees, if fewer Southerners died in 
Congress we then would ultimately see more chairs from the South. In 
addition, corruption is certainly a common problem in Congress. If 
Southerners were expelled from Congress at a lower rate, then that could 
explain the presence of longer serving Southerners. Finally, members of 
Congress can leave to take a wide variety of other offices. If Non-Southerners 
were more likely to seek these other offices, then it is possible that 
Southerners could be left to control the US House.  
 
   
 28
C. Data and Methods 
 
The initial plan for this section was to utilize the exact same dataset as 
Section 1. Doing so would permit an estimation of the probability of becoming 
a Chair in each region. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict the probability 
of being a Chair, while also considering the various paths that can lead 
someone to depart from the US House. As a result, this section relies on a 
merged dataset that combines the ICPSR Congressional Biographical set and 
the first dimension DW-Nominate scores from Poole and Rosenthal. Instead 
of predicting whether or not someone becomes a Chair, the model will 
examine the duration that each member serves in Congress and thus 
establish a hazard rate by region. Because the Democrats allocated all of 
their Committee Chairs by seniority prior to the Reform Era, predicting 
duration of membership is essentially the same thing as predicting the 
probability of becoming a Chair.  
Seven variables are included in the model as explanatory variables. 
The first two variables provide the only two demographic controls that are 
available in the dataset, gender and age. Gender is included strictly as a 
control and there are no expectations associated with it. Women do live 
longer than men so it is important to include the possibility that Women 
could ultimately serve longer because of their general longevity. Age is 
included as a control, but the expectation is that the older a member is, the 
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more likely he or she is to depart from the Congress. Two regional dummy 
variables are included as well. Separate dummies are included for the Deep 
South and the Border South.4 The baseline category, Non-South, is excluded 
and the other dummies serve as comparisons against the Non-Southern 
category. The expectation is that in each of the models the Southern and 
Border categories will be associated with longevity in Congress. Nominate 
scores are also included in the model as a control. When considering an 
outcome like a primary loss, voting record likely plays a critical role in 
explaining why someone lost an election. Finally, two interaction terms are 
included. I interact the region dummies with the DW-Nominate scores to 
capture the extent to which ideology in the South contributes to longevity in 
the Congress. 
The preceding variables are estimated in a Cox Event History 
Regression. This method permits us to analyze the factors that contribute to 
longevity in Congress. Survival is defined as being re-elected to Congress, 
while death is defined as departing from the chamber. This analysis 
examines hazard rates from the 70th through the 90th Congresses. The 90th 
Congress is one Congress past the peak of the Southern Bias in Committee 
Chairs that is identified in Figure 2. Looking at the data, it becomes clear 
that the longest anyone serves in Congress is about 20 terms. So, the start of 
the analysis is 40 years prior in the 70th Congress. As a result, the analysis 
                                                 
4 The same coding scheme for regions from section I is used again in Section II. 
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runs from 1927 through 1968. Because the number of possible durations is 
relatively small, there are a large number of ties. Consistent with 
methodological work on the subject, the Efron method is used to obtain a 
more accurate method of accounting for the composition of the risk set (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  
The final methodological components that merit discussion are the 
organization of the data in the event history analysis. Because there are 
multiple outcomes that serve to terminate a Congressional career, a 
competing risks model is necessary (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The 
initial analysis is essentially a pooled analysis that provides the coefficients 
for a model that simply predicts any departure from the House. The 
subsequent parts of the analysis re-estimate the model and consider each 
outcome separately. Doing so permits the analyst to weight how the different 
covariates contribute to different possible outcomes – in this case the 
different means of exiting the House. Finally, the model contains both static 
covariates and time varying covariates (TVCs). The region dummies and 
gender are fixed for each observation (each Congress) of each member. The 
age, ideology, and region-ideology interactions take a different value for each 
Congress. TVCs provide a richer analysis without complicating the 
interpretation of the results. 
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D. Results of the Event History Analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the event history analysis. The pooled 
model is presented in the first column and presents a picture that is 
consistent with our initial expectations. Gender has no effect on the 
departure from Congress, while each additional year older does increase the 
failure rate. As we would expect, getting older is associated with departing 
from the Congress. In the case of the regional dummies, compared to the 
baseline Non-Southern category, Southerners did tend to stay in Congress for 
longer. Being Southern is associated with a lower failure rate and thus a 
longer duration as a member of Congress. The ideology measures produce 
interesting results. While being more conservative tends to increase the 
failure rate, the South*Nominate interaction suggests that being a 
conservative Southerner depressed this effect. This finding is consistent with 
what we see in terms of Southern Committee Chairs during this period – 
Conservative Southerners tended to stick around much longer than other 
groups in Congress. The pooled model provides us with a general picture of 
the Southern path to establishing power, but many reasons for departure are 
included. The subsequent columns provide the competing risks component of 
the analysis and paint a much more complete picture. 
Losing in the General Election is the most common way to depart from 
Congress and thus is the first place to examine the differences between the 
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South and the Non-South. As expected, age continues to contribute to a 
higher failure. In addition, both of the regional dummies suggest that 
representatives from the Southern regions were substantially more likely to 
survive general elections. Without a competitive competing party, it would be 
hard to imagine the opposite outcome. For the Democrats, being more 
conservative (and thus more moderate) contributed to a higher likelihood of 
an election loss. Consistent with our expectations, the South moved toward 
higher levels of seniority in part because of their near immunity from 
meaningful general election challenges. 
Primaries present a very different set of risks for members of 
Congress. Over the relevant period, about half as many members lost in 
primaries as in general elections, but the raw number is sufficiently high to 
attract our attention. Age continued to contribute to losing a seat, while 
gender had no effect. In this case, the region dummies did not have a 
meaningful effect. There was no statistically significant difference in the 
primary risks for Southerners and Non-Southerners. Being more 
conservative in Democratic primaries did present the higher risks of loss that 
one would expect. The South*Nominate interaction tells us that Southern 
conservatives, however, were much less likely to lose. Consistent with 
previous findings, Southern conservatives were safer in the primary, the only 
place that they faced serious challenges. While older research has suggested 
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that Southern primaries could be vibrant, competitive forums, the results 
here suggest that Conservative Southerners were uniquely safe – setting the 
stage for their lengthy careers in Congress.  
Outside of electoral settings, there are a variety of factors that could 
mitigate Southern control of the senior positions in the Democratic Caucus. 
The first of these factors is death. A sizeable number of members do die in 
Congress. Table 6 shows that age is only predictor of dying in office and being 
older does increase the failure rate and thus increase the risk of dying. None 
of the other variables reach even marginal levels of significance. In contrast 
to death, retirement is the obvious voluntary path to leaving the US House. 
Age and being female contribute to retirement, but the regional dummies do 
not. Being more conservative is associated with departing – perhaps some 
evidence of self selection during this period that would culminate in a more 
liberal caucus in the 1970s. The South*Nominate interaction suggests at 
marginal levels of significance (p<0.1) that Conservative Southerners were 
less likely to retire. 
In addition to simply retiring from the chamber, a member could claim 
another office at either the state or federal level. The only significant 
predictor of duration in this case is being Southern – which is associated with 
a lower likelihood of departure. None of the predictors reach traditional levels 
of significance. Finally, though it is rare, a member could be expelled from 
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the chamber because of corruption or outside mischief. Not surprisingly, 
being older is associated with maturity or having survived long enough to not 
be caught. Conservatives apparently faced a higher risk of being expelled 
(p<0.1), but there is no difference among the regional groups. 
The overall picture presented here is that electoral forces provided the 
Southerners with a protective cushion relative to the Non-South. Other 
reasons for departure could have mitigated that effect, but, if anything, other 
factors like appointment to another office only contributed to Southern 
longevity relative to the Non-South. While this model does not directly 
explain the forces that contribute to being a Chair, it does provide a 
comprehensive picture of the forces that contribute to how long a member 
stays in Congress. Because longevity was directly linked to the likelihood of 
being a Committee Chair through the seniority system, this model provides 
excellent leverage into understanding how the South achieved its advantage 
in the US House. It would have been reasonable to expect that at least some 
factor would contribute to a Non-Southern advantage, but in every case 
presented here the Southern members enjoyed a favorable electoral 
environment for longevity and made strategic moves that contributed to their 
staying in the US House for longer periods of time than their Northern 
counterparts. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 
This paper aims to fill two notable gaps in the literature. Section I is 
an attempt to understand the true committee dynamics of the reform period 
in the 1970s. Having established that the committees did not change in the 
ways that Rohde (1991) suggests, we turn to a project that examines the 
convergence in opinions of the Southern Democrats who remain. In addition, 
the examination of committees shows that Southern Democrats did have 
disproportionate power in the years before the reform era. Section II is an 
effort to understand how that imbalance came about. Utilizing existing 
databases that provide annual details for members of Congress, it becomes 
clear that a wide variety of electoral and strategic factors contributed to the 
advantage that Southerners established in the 1960s.  
Since so much of our theory relies on explaining this unusual period in 
Congressional history, understanding the period between 1930 and 1975 
appears to be all the more important. The conventional wisdom among 
Congressional scholars has been to accept the story that strategic decisions 
guided fundamentally important institutional Democratic Party reforms in 
the early 1970s. The traditional story suggests that those reforms affected 
committee structure, committee membership, leadership positions on 
committees, and Congressional output. The research presented here 
challenges that traditional story. The theory of Conditional Party 
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Government specifically invokes this traditional wisdom and suggests that 
party reform efforts were the critical factor in establishing a homogenous 
Democratic Party Caucus. This paper does not challenge the outcome that 
parties became relevant after the Reform Era, but it does provide substantial 
evidence that replacement rather than institutional reform was the vehicle of 
change in the 93rd Congress.  
South Border Non-South
Mean Dw Nom Score 
88th-92nd Congress -0.0303 -0.2444 -0.3801
Mean Dw Nom Score 
93rd-97th Congress -0.1157 -0.2304 -0.3730
Difference 0.0854 -0.0139 -0.0071
Standard Error 0.0147 0.0190 0.0075
p value <0.0001 0.7672 0.8260
N 767 238 1654
All
South Border Non-South Regions
Mean Dw Nom Score 
88th-92nd Congress -0.0350 -0.2666 -0.3581 -0.1948
Mean Dw Nom Score 
93rd-97th Congress -0.1044 -0.3219 -0.4043 -0.3115
Difference 0.0694 0.0553 0.0461 0.1167
Standard Error 0.0369 0.0436 0.0278 0.0268
p value 0.0322 0.1083 0.0509 <0.0001
N 82 31 111 224
Region
Region
Table 1: T-Test for Difference between 5 Year Periods 
before and after the start of the 93rd Congress by 
Region for the Democratic Caucus
Table 2: T-Test for Difference between 5 Year Periods before and 
after the start of the 93rd Congress by Region for Democratic 
Chairs
APPENDIX
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South Border Non-South
Mean Dw Nom Score 
92nd Congress -0.0595 -0.2405 -0.3950
Mean Dw Nom Score 
93rd Congress -0.0741 -0.2396 -0.3947
Difference 0.0147 -0.0009 -0.0003
Standard Error 0.0363 0.0648 0.0167
p value 0.3432 0.4946 0.4934
N 116 34 275
All
South Border Non-South Regions
Mean Dw Nom Score 
92nd Congress -0.0912 -0.3180 -0.2889 -0.2137
Mean Dw Nom Score 
93rd Congress -0.0913 -0.3200 -0.2826 -0.2111
Difference 0.0002 0.0020 -0.0063 -0.0026
Standard Error 0.0868 0.0114 0.1003 -0.0026
p value 0.5007 0.4385 0.4755 0.5153
N 12 4 14 30
Region
Table 3: T-Test for Difference between 92nd and 93rd 
Congresses for Continuing Members of Congress by 
Region
Table 4: T-Test for Difference between 92nd and 93rd Chairs for 
Continuing Committee Chairs of Congress
Region
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Congress Year Chair Region DWNom Congress Year Chair Region DWNom
80 1947 Robert Doughton South 0.037 80 1947 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.113
81 1949 Robert Doughton South 0.061 81 1949 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.105
82 1951 Robert Doughton South 0.085 82 1951 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.096
83 1953 Jere Cooper Border -0.149 83 1953 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.087
84 1955 Jere Cooper Border -0.145 84 1955 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.078
85 1957 Jere Cooper Border -0.14 85 1957 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.069
85 1958 Wilbur Mills South -0.147 86 1959 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.061
86 1959 Wilbur Mills South -0.151 87 1961 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.052
87 1961 Wilbur Mills South -0.156 88 1963 Clarence Cannon Non-South -0.043
88 1963 Wilbur Mills South -0.16 88 1964 George Mahon South -0.095
89 1965 Wilbur Mills South -0.165 89 1965 George Mahon South -0.095
90 1967 Wilbur Mills South -0.17 90 1967 George Mahon South -0.095
91 1969 Wilbur Mills South -0.174 91 1969 George Mahon South -0.095
92 1971 Wilbur Mills South -0.179 92 1971 George Mahon South -0.095
93 1973 Wilbur Mills South -0.183 93 1973 George Mahon South -0.095
94 1975 Albert Ullman Non-South -0.325 94 1975 George Mahon South -0.095
95 1977 Albert Ullman Non-South -0.325 95 1977 George Mahon South -0.095
96 1979 Albert Ullman Non-South -0.325 96 1979 Jamie Whitten South -0.187
97 1981 Daniel Rostenkowski Non-South -0.374 97 1981 Jamie Whitten South -0.202
 
Congress Year Chair Region DWNom
80 1947 Adolph Sabath Non-South -0.524
81 1949 Adolph Sabath Non-South -0.529
82 1951 Adolph Sabath Non-South -0.535
83 1953 Howard Smith South 0.126
84 1955 Howard Smith South 0.14
85 1957 Howard Smith South 0.154
86 1959 Howard Smith South 0.169
87 1961 Howard Smith South 0.183
88 1963 Howard Smith South 0.197
89 1965 Howard Smith South 0.211
90 1967 William Colmer South 0.271
91 1969 William Colmer South 0.291
92 1971 William Colmer South 0.31
93 1973 Ray Madden Non-South -0.388
94 1975 Ray Madden Non-South -0.387
95 1977 James Delaney Non-South -0.288
96 1979 Richard Bolling Non-South -0.492
97 1981 Richard Bolling Non-South -0.494
Ways and Means Committee Appropriations Committee
Rules Committee
Table 5: Prestige Committee Chairs (1947-1983)
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